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Abstract 
 
Products are increasingly digitized, and they 
incorporate digital components, smart features and 
partial automation. Modern cars are a prime example 
of consumer-oriented automation; they sense the 
environment and perform specific driving tasks on the 
driver’s behalf. The driving assistance and safety 
features provided by automation are under constant 
development, and as these features evolve, drivers 
experience and learn about their capabilities as they 
use them and develop their trust in automation in the 
light of new experiences and information. In this 
paper, we present a study on how trust in car 
automation unfolds as users gain experiences and 
information that conflicts with their expectations 
concerning the level of automation. We use Tesla 
Model S car as our case technology and explore how 
its users develop their trust and cope with issues with 
the novel automation technology. Our findings suggest 
important directions for future research of consumer-
oriented automation and digitized products. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Digital transformation is rapidly changing the 
products we use in our everyday lives. Our phones, 
computers, tablets and loudspeakers understand our 
talk, communicate back to us and have a surprisingly 
wide repertoire of skills to entertain or assist us in 
everyday tasks. Our vacuum cleaners need no steering 
but navigate around the house autonomously and 
return back to base for recharging before the battery 
runs out. Our cars can sense the traffic around them, 
assist us in braking, lane-keeping and collision 
detection and some cars may even park themselves. 
Even better, some of these products are continuously 
improved through regular software updates. But 
therein lies a trade-off. In the old world, when we 
bought mechanical products carefully manufactured, 
tried and tested in different conditions, what we saw 
was often very close to what we got. With the new 
wave of digitized and connected products, we may buy 
into the future-looking visions and desires yet end up 
with unfinished products and continuous updates  [1]. 
Digitized and connected products can be defined as 
products that are composed of both physical and 
digital components and connected to communication 
networks [2] [3]. The incorporation of computer-
controlled functionality and connectivity enables the 
cost-efficient modification of product functionality 
remotely and over time without changing the physical 
embodiment of a product  [2] [3]. Unlike the physical 
embodiments that tend to receive their final form by 
the end of manufacture, the computer-controlled 
functionality remains more open-ended. The re-
programmability of digital components allows for 
frequent change, and, this way, digitized and 
connected products are malleable and can remain 
constantly in the making  [4] [5]. Digitisation and 
connectivity also provide means for gathering real 
time data on the use and behavior of a product, and this 
data can then be used to develop the product further.  
From a buyers’ perspective, this open-endedness 
means in practice that users are increasingly buying 
products whose functionality, utility and reliability 
remain to some extent unknown while changing over 
time. Users are therefore subjected to a degree of 
uncertainty and vulnerability, yet they are also 
expected to frequently revise their expectations 
concerning the product functionality as updates are 
released and new experiences and information emerge. 
The presence of uncertainty and vulnerability assumes 
that [6] trust plays a prominent role when users decide 
whether to rely or use certain functionalities.  
Modern cars with autonomous driving features 
provide a prime example of digitized and connected 
products in the making [1] [2]. Although car 
manufacturers adhere to different development, 
deployment and marketing strategies, they converge at 
their aims to introduce more sophisticated autonomous 
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driving features to assist the driver or to replace the 
driver altogether.  
Unlike airline pilots or other professionals, regular 
drivers do not receive training for using the automated 
driving features. Instead, they form their expectations 
based on marketing, test drives and any other available 
information before the purchase and then are expected 
to adjust the expectation based on experience and new 
information. Through experience, drivers may learn 
how to maneuver a car with its autonomous features, 
especially when encountering situations and issues 
and after any feature updates. Yet the misaligned 
expectations regarding the capabilities of driving 
automation may put the driver, passengers and other 
road traffic in danger [7]. Therefore, the role of trust 
in car automation can be viewed as accentuated. 
Several studies have shown the importance of trust 
in the adoption and use of automation [6] [10] and 
autonomous driving technologies  [8] [9]. While the 
earlier literature on human factors and automation has 
focused on task allocation [11] and the interplay 
between the operator and technology of automation 
from various perspectives in professional and 
controlled settings such as space and aviation 
industries [7], there is a little research on how 
consumers form trust in the autonomous driving 
technologies that are incomplete and under 
development. 
In this paper, we study the formation of trust in the 
view of consumer-oriented automation and with 
reference to digitized and connected products which 
are constantly in the making using the Autopilot 
functionality of Tesla Model S as a case study. 
Empirical evidence is gathered from online 
discussions forums where Tesla drives share their 
experiences and discuss the capabilities and 
functioning of the Autopilot functionality.  
To this, our research question can be summarized 
as follows: How does trust in automation unfold in the 
context of digitized and connected cars, which are 
constantly in the making? 
The subsequent chapter reviews the related 
literature on trust providing conceptual framing. 
Chapter three presents the case Tesla as a case to study 
and describes collection and analysis procedures. 
Then, chapter four presents the empirical findings, and 
their implications are discussed in chapter five. The 
concluding remarks are in chapter six. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
This chapter outlines the conceptual framing that 
provides the backdrop upon which the formation of the 
trust in automation can be reflected.  
 
2.1. Trust as irrational risk taking 
 
Trust plays a prominent role in human action. We 
habitually extend trust and expect trustworthiness as 
we depend on the competence and good intentions of 
others [12]; we trust others to act on their 
commitments, yet misplaced trust may bring serious 
consequences or prove even fatal. The importance of 
trust in social interactions and material exchanges has 
attracted attention in various fields of research, 
ranging from sociology  [13] [14] to organization 
studies [15] and from psychology [12] to human 
factors and automation studies [6]. This has resulted 
multiple definitions of trust, such as faith, 
expectations, predictability, familiarity, risk, reliance 
and dependence in association with their antecedents 
and consequences under different conditions.  
Luhmann [13] postulates that trust is needed when 
embarking on ventures that depart from the continuity 
of the familiar. In this view, trust is intimately 
associated with uncertainty and possibility of 
unwanted outcomes. Decision-makers generally aim 
at positive outcomes by evaluating the degree of 
uncertainty and expectations regarding some future 
states and events [16], but events often unfold in an 
unforeseen manner. Although some specific risks can 
be quantified by weighing probabilities of positive and 
negative outcomes with their respective gains and 
losses, many future states and events remain 
fundamentally uncertain for all practical purposes; 
they transcend rational analyses given the complexity 
of environmental conditions, lack of information and 
limitations of our cognitive faculties [17]. However, 
the lack of purely calculative and rational analysis in 
decision-making does not prevent us from making 
choices. We routinely make decisions without 
appreciating all possible consequences  [18]. 
To emphasize the connection between the trust and 
decision-making, Luhmann  [13] [14] differentiates 
between non-choice (confidence) and choice (trust). 
Confidence belongs to the realm of situations and 
relationships a person is automatically part of but has 
no control over the future states and events. Trust, in 
turn, applies to situations where the future states and 
events remain fundamentally uncertain and risky, yet 
there is a real possibility to refrain from entering into 
a situation that puts the decision-maker into a 
vulnerable position, while simultaneously forgoing 
potential benefits and gains attainable by opting in. 
When risks cannot be fully analyzed [17], trust 
black-boxes the impenetrable complexity and renders 
a foundation upon which decisions can be based and 
made  [14] [13]. Therefore, trust, regardless of how it 
is formed or is constructed, allows us to act and make 
decisions. Trust indicates readiness for risk taking, 
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which is not necessarily rational in the traditional 
sense of the word. 
 
2.2. Trust in technology and automation 
 
A decision to depend on automation requires trust. 
The promise of automation is that a product or system 
performs tasks on the user’s (operator) behalf; 
automation can be defined to refer ”the full or partial 
replacement of a function previously carried out by the 
human operator”  [11] (p. 287). This brings forward 
the functional comparability between the human and 
automated control of operations, and it also indicates 
that the scope and capabilities of automation are 
contingent upon tasks, technologies and context.  
As the scope and capabilities vary, a user should be 
able to trust that the reliance on automation (agent) 
would produce a favorable outcome. This is 
formulated by Lee and See [6] as follows: ”[t]rust can 
be defined as the attitude that an agent will help 
achieve and individual’s goals in a situation 
characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability” (p. 
51). Therefore, trust is viewed to precede a decision to 
rely on automation that puts the user potentially in the 
harm’s way. 
Occasionally, trust in automation is considered as 
equivalent to trust in humans, however, research on 
decision support systems shows that people respond 
differently to human and computer-based assistants  
[19]. Several differences also emerge from the ways 
how technologies are designed, developed and 
regulated and how they are marketed to consumers and 
discussed in user communities, bringing a variety of 
organizational, institutional and sociological aspects 
into consideration [20]. In addition, technologies are 
often black boxes; their internal functioning remains 
hidden from and inexplicable to their users, especially 
as technologies grow in complexity. Instead of being 
able to scrutinize the internal processes and underlying 
logic, the users are only able to experience the 
outcomes they produce [21]. Therefore, they come to 
evaluate the trustworthiness of some particular 
technology, its competence and good intentions [12], 
based on their experiences and the information they 
gather from the manufacturer and other users. All this 
affects the extent to which users trust in automation 
and how they may or may not put it to use.  
Parasuraman and Riley [22] differentiate between 
the misuse, disuse and abuse of automation. Misuse 
refers to situations where excessive reliance is placed 
on automation without appropriate scrutiny, whereas 
disuse has to do with situations where automation 
becomes under-utilized or neglected. Abuse, in turn, 
refers to design practices where no sufficient attention 
is paid to how a product or system and its operator will 
interact, leading potentially to substandard automation 
and interaction designs, which create environments 
and situations that feed to both the misuse and disuse 
of automation. Ideally, to avoid misuse and disuse, the 
expectations concerning the capabilities of automation 
and the actual capabilities of automation should be 
aligned.  
 
2.3. Formation of trust 
 
The relationship between the expectations and 
capabilities of automation and the formation of this 
relationship can be viewed through the lenses of 
alignment and coping. 
Alignment [6] deals with the extent to which a 
person’s trust in the automated system is aligned with 
its actual capabilities, that is, the alignment between 
the perceived and actual trustworthiness. Ideally, these 
two should be the same. However, this is not often the 
case leading to the situations that can be characterized 
by overtrust or distrust. Overtrust occurs when the 
level of trust exceeds the capabilities of the system, 
and distrust indicates a situation where the level of 
trust is below the system’s capabilities. Overtrust is 
prone to lead use to misuse and overreliance, whereas 
distrust may lead to underutilization. 
The alignment between the level of trust and 
system capabilities can be approached through the 
process of calibration  [6], which assumes that users 
adjust the level of perceived trustworthiness in the 
light of new experiences and information. Functional 
and temporal specificity and resolution influences the 
process of calibration [6]. Resolution concerns how a 
change in the capabilities of automation reflects on the 
perceived level of trustworthiness. Overall, if 
resolution is low, a major change in the capabilities of 
automation may produce only minor change in trust. 
Furthermore, functional specificity refers to what 
extent the capabilities of specific automated 
functionalities are recognized. If a user is able to direct 
trust at specific functionalities and capabilities, 
functional specificity is high. In turn, if the level of 
trust reflects the system as a whole, functional 
specificity is low. Moreover, specificity refers also to 
temporality. High temporal specificity indicates 
instant reactions to changes in automated capabilities, 
whereas low temporal specificity signals a delay 
between the changes in the capabilities of automation 
and the subsequent adjustment of the levels of trust. 
Overall, calibration, resolution and specificity provide 
lenses through which the formation and alignment of 
trust can be approached. 
Coping, in turn, shifts the focal point from the 
alignment and process of calibration to cognitive and 
behavioral efforts that users exert to overcome the 
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situations that are taxing or exceed the resources at 
their disposal [33]. This may happen when users are 
not able to calibrate and align their expectations 
towards automation yet are being left to deal with a 
problematic experiences and situations. Although a 
user’s decision to exert or withdraw trust can be 
viewed as a consumer’s risk-coping mechanisms  [23], 
Pearlin and Schooler  [24] offer a more fine-grained 
conceptualization. They describe three categories of 
coping mechanisms, which are activated depending on 
the situation and problematic experience. The first 
category refers to situations where coping is carried 
out by eliminating or modifying the conditions that 
give rise to the problematic experience, and this could 
be viewed as a decision to extend or withdraw trust. 
The second one takes the form of perceptually 
controlling the meaning of the experience to neutralize 
the its problematic character. This can, for example, 
take the form of comparison in which one’s experience 
is compared to those of others thus reducing the 
uniqueness of the experience and also the stress 
following from that experience. Alternatively, the 
problematic aspects of the experience can be 
selectively ignored or reasoned way [25]. The third 
category of mechanisms refers to the controlling of 
emotions to keep the stress and emotional 
consequences of the experience under control. Instead 
of eliminating the problematic experience or 
controlling its meaning, the third category 
acknowledges the problematic nature of the 
experience, and the coping takes the form of a person 
accepting the experience as something inevitable one 
has simply to live with. Stress therefore becomes 
something that cannot be avoided but can only be 
controlled while hoping that somehow rewards would 
follow. This is similar to Luhmann’s [13] notion of 
confidence which characterizes the settings and 
situations one is automatically part of but has no 
control over the future states and events. Thereby, 
coping can take place through the elimination of a 
problematic experience, the removal of cognitive 
dissonances or accepting a situation as inevitable. 
To conclude, the alignment of the perceived and 
actual trustworthiness [6] [25] along with the three 
mechanisms of coping [24] to overcome the lack of 
alignment offer sensitizing devices [26] with reference 
to which the formation of trust in automation can be 
examined. 
 
3. Method 
 
This study into the formation into trust in 
automation in the context of digitized and connected 
products is designed as an exploratory case study [27] 
[28]. We chose Tesla Model S car as our case study as 
Tesla is often considered as one of the most prominent 
manufacturers of automated driving. The company 
markets the cars with the future-looking promises of 
fully autonomous driving as the capabilities of cars are 
gradually improved and updated.  
The first Model S cars were delivered to customers 
in June 2012, and the car serves as a prime example of 
a digitized and connected product that incorporates 
consumer-oriented automation in the form of the 
Autopilot functionality [1]. Tesla’s efforts to augment 
and automate driving are often subsumed under the 
label Autopilot, which, broadly speaking, is a general 
referent for a suite of functions that provide safety, 
driving assistance and self-driving features and 
functionalities; it consists of a set of capabilities each 
geared to serve a specific functional purpose.  
Currently, in terms of SAE International’s Levels of 
Driving Automation for On-Road Vehicles, the most 
advanced feature of Tesla’s Autopilot package 
(Autosteer (Beta)) reaches the level two on the scale 
of one to five, where one stands for driver assistance 
and five for full automation  [29]. The company states 
that their long-term goal is to increase the level 
automation incrementally and to reach eventually the 
level of full automation.  
Thereby, the Autopilot functionality is under 
continuous development. Over time, Tesla has 
developed and introduced new functionalities for 
automated driving and increased their capabilities. 
Updates to the software that controls the Autopilot 
functionalities are frequently released. In 2016, the 
company started equipping cars with a more capable 
set of sensors and computing hardware to pave the way 
towards more demanding scenarios of automated 
driving.  
The Autopilot functionality and the utilization of 
frequent software updates render the Model S as a 
revelatory case, although it could also be considered 
as a representative case as it belongs to well-
established product group of premium sedans [27]. 
 
3.1. Data collection 
 
Data was collected from the Tesla Motors Club 
(TMC) discussion forum. TMC was formed in 2006 
and was the first independent online Tesla community. 
Today it remains the largest community of Tesla users 
and enthusiasts. The forum features discussions dating 
from today to the early days of first Tesla releases. The 
structure of the forum and the discussions is well 
organized and covers a wide variety of topics. Many 
TMC posters own a Tesla and have first-hand, real 
experience of the technology. 
For our study, the postings on the forum offered a 
rich, first-hand description from users who had already 
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formed an initial trust in the automation technology 
and were now reflecting upon the trustworthiness 
based on their own experiences and information from 
others shared in the forum. This enabled us to examine 
through narratives from the users how their trust in 
automation were manifested as new experiences and 
information emerged. 
To narrow the data down to topic areas related to 
trust in the view of automated driving, we focused on 
discussion threads covering incidents and accidents. 
We first created a shortlist of 53 threads selected based 
on the topics of threads. Of these, we selected three 
threads for further examination, one of which 
discussed a crash reported in the news and two which 
were personal accounts of accidents a driver had 
experienced and reported on the forum. We decided to 
focus on threads that reflect everyday experiences and 
have a sufficiently large number of postings to obtain 
a rich set of data. We excluded discussions of the two 
published fatal accidents in USA and China as extreme 
cases. 
 
Table 1.  Description of the selected 
discussion threads 
 Time period Posts Posters 
Thread 1 23/12/16 - 25/1/17 100 50 
Thread 2 16/5/16 - 5/8/17 358 89 
Thread 3 13/1/16 - 9/3/16 593 162 
 
Summary details of the threads are listed in Table 
1 above. All three threads were initiated and mostly 
commented during 2016 they were thus comparable in 
terms of the maturity of technology discussed and 
public information about the technology and incidents 
available at the time.  
 
3.2. Data analysis 
 
We extracted the selected discussion threads from 
the discussion forum into offline documents with a 
script and then loaded them into Atlas.ti 8.0 software, 
which is a tool for qualitative data analysis. 
For the two first threads (Thread 1 and Thread 2), 
we analyzed the postings with an interpretative 
clustering method in which text excerpts that have 
similar patterns or characteristics are grouped and then 
developed into conceptualizations [30]. During the 
first round of coding, we identified themes such as 
incidents that had happened, perceived causes for 
those incidents and thus causes for distrust, 
mechanisms to cope with the distrust, and 
development trajectories in the user trust toward 
automation technology. Within each coded quote we 
also coded each poster separately to be able to analyze 
similarities and differences at the user level. 
During the second round of coding, the coded 
quotes were compared, and the text documents were 
reread in order to check that the codes were coherently 
applied. At this time, some quotes were re-coded, 
some codes deleted, some re-named and some new 
quotations were included. 
Thread 3 was used to confirm the results from the 
two first threads and to ensure the applicability of the 
generated codes to a similar thread. 
 
4. Findings 
 
This chapter outlines the content of the analyzed 
threads and reports the themes and concepts identified 
during the data analysis. 
The first of the analyzed threads thread started with 
a Tesla driver describing an accident that he had been 
involved in: ”A week ago I was headed to work in my 
Model S and the AP [autopilot] pulled me into a truck 
driving by my side. I was driving into the sun so had 
the AP on to assist with my safety. Cruising along just 
fine until all the sudden I hear an impact and a crunch 
to my right. My car had pulled me into a Semi. 
Fortunately I had my hand on the wheel and was able 
to pull away from the truck before going completely 
under it.” 
The second started with a poster quoting a news 
article which reported a recent Tesla accident. Arianna 
Simpson had been driving her Model S north from Los 
Angeles on I-5, cruising in the autopilot mode: ”All of 
a sudden the car ahead of me came to a halt. There 
was a decent amount of space so I figured that the car 
was going to brake as it is supposed to and didn’t 
brake immediately. When it became apparent that the 
car was not slowing down at all, I slammed on the 
brakes but was probably still going 40 when I collided 
with the other car.” The news article reported that 
Tesla’s log showed the autopilot mode had been 
disengaged at the time she manually hit the brake. 
In both cases, the threads continued with different 
posters discussing the perceived causes of these 
accidents while also sharing similar experiences and 
reflecting how they felt about Autopilot after learning 
from these incidents and their own experiences. 
The third thread reported a minor collision with 
another car after an Autopilot update and due to 
misaligned expectations: “My car slowed as well. But 
when the car in front of me came to a complete stop 
(not a sudden emergency stop, but rather a gradual 
stop), I expected my car to do the same (as it had been 
doing previously). It didn't. I slammed on the brakes in 
that dreadful instance before I realized my car 
wouldn't stop in time, but I still hit the car in front of 
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me.“ This was followed by a discussion on whether 
the autopilot can be trusted or not, many posters 
reminding others to be aware that “The car doesn't 
drive itself, it's driver assistance, not self driving.”  
The initial analysis confirmed our expectations of 
Tesla as a digital and connected product that 
undergoes continuous development and change. Also, 
it was clear from the threads that not the drivers’ 
expectations concerning the capabilities of driving 
automation and the actual technological capabilities 
were not fully aligned. Many reported having 
encountered unexpected situations and issues that 
differed from their initial expectations. The drivers 
were constantly learning and forming their 
expectations and trust towards the technology as they 
used and learned from Autopilot. Also, many users 
also acknowledged the ”beta” status of Autopilot and 
expected the autonomous features to improve over 
time. 
 
4.1. Perceived causes for misalignment and 
distrust 
 
We first analyzed perceived causes of these 
incidents to identity potential causes for misalignment 
and distrust. This gives important information for 
understanding how to improve the alignment and to 
overcome distrust. Our data indicated that the users 
were divided on why incidents happened, others 
blaming the driver and others the technology. 
The human driver. Some posters saw the human 
drivers as root cause for all issues. In the end, they 
should be able to control the car in all circumstances. 
Further arguments calling for driver responsibility 
outlined that sufficient documentation and information 
is available for the drivers to be aware of the issues and 
to adequately prepare for them. 
Several posters stated that the driver is responsible 
of the system at all times. The driver needs to pay 
attention to the system and environment and be 
prepared to take over at any time. This line of 
argument maintained that the driver is to blame for any 
and all incidents - not the system. ”Classic cruise 
control, TACC [Traffic-Aware Cruise Control], 
AutoPilot ... it does not matter - in all cases at all times 
the driver is responsible for the safe movement of the 
vehicle. The failure is with the driver.” 
Moreover, some argued that current limitations of 
the technology are documented well enough in Tesla 
user manual and/or is flagged in warnings when users 
turn on Autopilot. Drivers just need to be familiar of 
these to know how the technology actually performs 
and what is expected from them to prevent accidents. 
”Her case is described in the manual very clearly: 
’Warning: Traffic-Aware Cruise Control can not 
detect all objects and may not brake/decelerate for 
stationary vehicles, especially in situations when you 
are driving over 50 mph (80 km/h) and a vehicle you 
are following moves out of your driving path and a 
stationary vehicle or object, bicycle, or pedestrian is 
in front of you instead. […].’ The problem is who 
would want to read the manual?”  
Some also argued that the driver needs to be aware 
of “known” bugs and issues, the system and its design 
as well as be aware that the system is still “beta” and 
not working perfectly in all situations. The drivers 
were seen to be responsible to seek information of the 
system and take caution when using it. ”But if the 
technology is functioning as designed, whereas the 
design has known and acknowledged limitations, how 
is it a technology ’problem’? TACC, AEB, Autosteer 
have limitations, but I don’t think it’s correct to 
characterize those as ’flaws’ or ’problems’. Those 
technologies are doing exactly what they’re supposed 
to do.” 
The other camp countered the arguments regarding 
the drivers’ responsibility and maintained that as the 
system performs well most of the time requiring little 
control, people learn to trust it too much. They 
wouldn’t pay enough attention all the time to be 
prepared to take control in situations when the system 
suddenly does not behave as expected. ”Yeah, the fact 
that it works really well for long stretches of freeway, 
and then suddenly fails for a variety of reasons, is the 
real problem. It really does lull you into complacency. 
It is all very nice to get up on your high horse and say 
that people who don’t monitor the road when AP is 
running are losers, stupid and deserve to die. Our 
brains, though, are wired to adapt to situations. When 
you drive 100 trouble free miles, it is human nature to 
get sloppy.” 
Some argued that the reasons behind human errors 
and misaligned expectations were linked to Tesla’s 
marketing practices and the lack of driver training. In 
terms marketing, it was commented that Tesla 
provides too optimistic a picture of the car’s 
performance in its marketing materials and during the 
sales process. In terms of training, some argued that 
Tesla would need to educate new drivers better about 
the capabilities, known limitations and issues so that 
the drivers would better informed and prepared to 
prevent accidents. ”The driver is 100 percent 
responsible for the vehicle, 100 percent of the time.  If 
they don’t understand this, they likely should not be 
driving any vehicle. In my opinion Tesla needs to do a 
much better job explaining this before delivery.  
Clearly some drivers will need additional 
training/education that outlines the limitations of the 
TACC/Autosteer before they start using it.”  
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The technology. Many argued that the technology 
is not ”good enough” or needs to improve. These 
comments critiqued the technology and the way it has 
been designed as a reason for the incidents. Some 
posters criticized some specific technical feature, such 
as Autopilot, whereas some included the Tesla brand 
in the conversation and argued that some features of 
Tesla technology are not as advanced as some other 
brands in the market. ”This was caused by the number 
1 problem of autopilot. Not knowing whether or not it 
is engaged. Twice now I’ve been cruising on the 
freeway thinking AP was on when it wasn’t. There are 
many events which cause AP to turn off once you turn 
it on. The only indication Tesla gives you that AP has 
turned off is a relatively quiet chime (and a very small 
icon that turns from blue to grey). This isn’t enough of 
a warning that AP is no longer active. Tesla needs to 
address this now.” ”[…] and yes, for all the great stuff 
Tesla has today, it’s got some catching up to do with 
others – at least from my POV having owned and 
experienced several vehicles with variants on the 
”automated safety assist” capabilities.” 
However, there were several counter arguments in 
favor of the technology as well. It was maintained that 
regardless of the limitations the technology is safer 
than human drivers and reduces accidents; or it is just 
a driver assist feature and should be treated as such 
rather than semi-autonomous feature; or that the 
current state of technological development does not 
enable better functionality and therefore performs as 
well as it can shifting responsibility back to the human 
driver. ”The car is not supposed to drive itself. Do you 
own an AP equipped Tesla? The thinking that the car 
is really autonomous is a big problem. AP is really 
driver’s assist and not autonomous. Read the docs.” 
These causes for misalignment and distrust could 
be seen as largely external to the commenters 
themselves, i.e., in most cases, these were comments 
made on why a certain event had occurred and who 
was to blame. However, in the comments on how users 
dealt with these issues, the focus was more on users 
reflecting their own behavior and trust towards 
technology. In the following section we will look at 
how the different levels and resolutions of trust 
alignment resulted in particular coping behavior in 
relation to automated driving.  
 
4.2. Formation of trust and coping behaviors 
 
Many users shared their own experiences about 
incidents or narrow escape situations when using the 
autonomous driving functions of their Tesla cars: 
either Autopilot (AP) or Traffic-Aware Cruise Control 
(TACC) or both. While the technology is the same and 
the described incidents were similar, we were able to 
distinguish three types of users whose perception of 
the trustworthiness of the technology developed into 
different directions after incidents. We named these 
groups Trust, Low Trust and No Trust and describe 
each of them in more detail below. 
Group 1: Trust. The users in this group agreed 
that the technology is imperfect and does not always 
work flawlessly. Despite the incidents these users had 
encountered they still felt positive about using the 
automation technology and described ways in which 
they had learned to use the technology to prepare for 
and avoid the incidents. These users further 
maintained that they understood when and where the 
technology could fail and could therefore manage 
these situations. This had not always been the case 
from the start but rather an outcome from learning by 
using.  
The quote below is illustrative of the users in this 
group. The poster first describes a situation where the 
automation may not function as expected, describes 
the poster’s strategy for that situation which indicates 
confidence in being able to successfully manage the 
situation and gives an indication that this has been 
learned over time. Finally, the poster highlights 
satisfaction with the automation technology. 
”I’ve had several instances where I’ve felt the need 
to brake myself. 100 percent of the time it has been 
where there is a stopped (or very slow) vehicle ahead 
and my speed is above 40mph. If my vehicle doesn’t 
slow down once that vehicle appears on the display, I 
prepare to brake. Perhaps TACC would’ve kicked in 
but when it gets uncomfortably close, I step in just like 
I did when using dumb cruise control. My new way of 
driving: turn on TACC and Autosteer (if available), 
watch the flow of traffic, take over, repeat This has not 
lessened my AP enjoyment in the least. In fact, I see 
AP as providing the best of both worlds – autonomous 
driving when it is boring (start/stop traffic and long 
monotonous stretches) and self-drive the rest of the 
time.”  
It was clear that for this group of users their own 
experiences as well as those shared in the discussion 
forum had not diminished their trust in the technology. 
On the contrary, through experience and learning they 
had been able to develop preconceptions on how the 
technology may behave in different situations and then 
prepare their own actions as a strategy for those 
situations, thus growing more confident that they are 
in control of the situations and can cope with using the 
automation.  
Over time, this group of users were able to 
calibrate and align their expectations of technological 
capabilities with sufficient functional specificity and 
resolution [6]. This group resorted to the second 
coping mechanism by Pearlin and Scooler [24] to 
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control the meaning of their experiences by 
developing an understanding of situations where the 
technology could fail. This way, they are able to plan 
their own actions for those situations, which gives 
them a sense of gaining control while reducing stress. 
Through the alignment of expectations and the control 
of the meaning of their experiences, users were able to 
maintain or even increase their trust in automation. 
 Group 2: Low trust. The users in this group 
agreed that the technology is imperfect and has its 
faults, and they had experienced similar issues as the 
first group. These users, however, were significantly 
less confident in understanding when and how the 
technology could behave unexpectedly and felt they 
needed to be more cautious when continuing to use the 
technology.  
”I was one of the biggest fans and advocates of AP 
and TACC, and have seen it stop safely 98 percent of 
the time. But these highly reported accidents, together 
with many unreported others, and my own experience 
have lead me to now be more cautious and wary of the 
features, as there definitely are a few cases in which it 
just doesn’t respond adequately.” ”Personally I view 
the Tesla autopilot [ as] a darn good capable and 
impressive system but still one that is always looking 
for new ways to kill me or damage the car so it can’t 
be fully trusted. I don’t think that opinion will change 
until such time as FSD [full self-driving] has been 
implemented and has years of demonstrated success.” 
When compared with the first group, the key 
differentiating factors for group two were lower 
confidence in being able to foresee unexpected 
situations, demanding a higher level of alertness when 
using the technology, which appeared to lead to higher 
levels of stress. However, this group continued to use 
the automation technology while trying to manage the 
stress and uncertainty, but with lower level of trust 
than group one.  
Unlike the group one, it appears that this group of 
users was not able to calibrate and align their 
expectations of technological capabilities with 
sufficient functional specificity and resolution [6]. 
Therefore, they appeared to resort to the third coping 
mechanism by Pearlin and Scooler [24] by seeking to 
control their emotions to keep the stress and emotional 
consequences of the experience under control. They 
had accepted the unexpected behavior of the 
automation as inevitable and controlled the resulting 
stress by highlighting the need for cautiousness and 
alertness on the road, yet they had not been abler to 
develop an understanding of technological capabilities 
to reduce the stress by gaining the feeling of control. 
Group 3: No trust. The users in this group 
reported experiences of incidents similar to the two 
other groups but differed in that their accounts 
described the lowest level of trust. They expressed 
their disappointment with the technology as they 
learned from their own negative experiences and the 
information provided by others. They commented the 
faults in the technology and felt that it was very 
unpredictable. Some had stopped using autonomous 
features in particular situations or did not use them at 
all anymore or regretted purchasing them. 
”My ’truck lust’ experiences are much more 
frequent than that. So much so that I usually disengage 
AP until I pass the truck to avoid the stress.” ”AP is 
definitely not the safety feature I thought it was on 
purchasing and with 20:20 hindsight I’d not spec AP1 
or AP2 for a current purchase - too many unknowns 
related to future performance” 
It appears that the expectations regarding the 
trustworthiness of the technology were not aligned 
with the technological capabilities nor calibrated in the 
light of new information [6]. Users in this group did 
not feel they were in control in the same way as the 
users in the trust group, and they could not manage the 
stress as the users in the low trust group did. This 
group resorted to the first coping mechanism by 
Pearlin and Scooler [24] switching off automation to 
eliminate or modify the problematic conditions, 
thereby leading to disuse of automation. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore how trust 
in automation unfolds and develops along different 
trajectories in the context of digitized and connected 
products and in situations where users gain new 
experiences and information that might be in conflict 
with their previous expectations. Through our analysis 
of users perceptions and responses, we were able to 
discover several interesting insights that contribute to 
the current knowledge on trust in autonomous vehicles 
and on digitized and connected products more broadly. 
First, it is clear from our data that the autonomous 
car technology is still in the making and that users 
frequently encounter unexpected situations with the 
technology. The users are therefore constantly 
learning and adjusting their expectations and trust in 
automation as well as their ways of managing and 
coping with challenging situations. For digitized and 
connected products, this means a continuous need for 
the users to dynamically calibrate their trust both when 
they learn and discover new information on product 
functionality and when software updates change the 
behavior of a product. To the best of our knowledge, 
this dynamic formation of trust on automation has not 
been studied earlier and this paper proposes an 
important direction for future research on car 
automation and digitized and connected products. 
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Second, we identified different perceived causes 
for the misalignment of expectations and distrust. Our 
findings suggest that the causes are centered around 
the debate of human driver responsibility vs. 
technological readiness. Marketing and driver training 
were seen as means to increase drivers’ knowledge on 
potential issues and as a way to increase their ability 
to prepare for and avoid them.  
Third, we identified three different user groups 
where the users had very similar experiences on the 
same automation technology but for whom, based on 
the same new information, the trust in the technology 
had developed to different directions. While the users 
in the no trust group stopped using particular 
automation features of their cars, the trust and low 
trust groups both continued using the technology but 
expressed the differing levels of alignment and 
mechanisms of coping mechanisms while projecting 
differing levels of stress when discussing their views 
on the current and future use. While the literature on 
trust in technology has highlighted that system 
characteristics, such as functionality, reliability and 
helpfulness contribute to greater user trust in a system 
[30], our findings bring forward the individual 
differences in the perceptions and attitudes regarding 
the trustworthiness and readiness for risk-taking even 
in the context of the same technology.  
Finally, our findings imply that by identifying 
origins of distrust and by working to align users’ 
expectations with technological capabilities the 
challenges of using automation could be mitigated. 
With more training, the users in low trust and no trust 
groups could use autonomation more confidently 
within the boundaries of its affordances and 
constraints. Over time, the users may also be able to 
perceive improvements in the technology and 
reduction of the issues, and potentially even contribute 
to the changes to improve their trust. Also, even for 
imperfect systems, there are users who accept their 
limitations and are able to overcome initial distrust 
through the processes of calibration and coping. Our 
findings indicate a connection between trust formation 
and coping mechanisms and suggest that both streams 
of literature contribute to the theoretical base for trust 
in digitized and connected products. 
 
5.1. Limitations and future research 
 
One limitation in our research is that we used data 
from Tesla Motors Club online forum rather than data 
directly collected by researchers. We thus had little 
data about user demographics and characteristics, such 
as innovativeness, which could have an impact in trust 
formation. One direction for future research could be 
to extend the current research with multi-method data 
by collecting either interview or survey data of Tesla 
users and including the measures of individual 
characteristics which could further explain trust in 
automation as well as its development over time. 
Another limitation in our study was that the data 
covered two threads discussed at the same point in 
time. While this was justifiable in the exploratory 
phase of the research to exclude potential interference 
of changes over time, a longitudinal analysis in the 
second phase could provide a more insightful picture.  
Our data indicates that users expect the technology to 
improve over time, which may also affect their 
willingness to cope with issues. Interesting questions 
for future research are what happens if the technology 
does not develop as users expect and what strategies 
could be used to mitigate negative reactions.  
Finally, our case example Tesla represents both a 
very innovative technology and a relatively expensive 
brand. Therefore, Tesla users are not a representative 
sample of a general population but rather users that are 
likely representatives of innovators or early adopters 
[32].  Thus, they may be more willing to accept issues 
and limitations of technology. Furthermore, the Tesla 
product development and marketing strategy is 
distinct compared to other brands and the company is 
actively making the autonomous features available for 
users while at the same time updating and improving 
these functionalities. Future research could extend the 
analysis to more varied user groups: users of other car 
brands and those who prefer to perform driving tasks 
manually, themselves. Lastly, the research should be 
extended to users of other types of digitized products. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Through the case Tesla Model S car, we studied 
how trust in automation unfolds and develops in 
situations where users gain new experiences and 
information that contradicts their expectations of the 
functionality of the automation. Our findings 
contribute to the existing knowledge on trust in 
automation technology and digitized and connected 
products by identifying three different groups of users 
who had developed three different trust trajectories 
and used different coping mechanisms for overcoming 
uncertainties and stress caused by issues with the 
automation. Our findings link the theories on trust 
formation and coping mechanisms and suggest that the 
skills and characteristics of users, their readiness to 
calibrate expectations under new experience and 
information and the mechanisms of coping rather than 
the solely technological capabilities of automation 
may explain the dynamic formation of trust. Our 
analysis of the causes of distrust further indicate that 
clear communication and training of users in the short 
Page 5785
term and clearly presented improvements in the 
automation technology in the long term, with potential 
user involvement in the development, may 
significantly reduce user distrust and help them 
manage issues with digitized and connected products 
under continuous development. Key directions for 
future research include understanding the 
characteristics of users in the three groups in more 
detail and extending the analysis to wider user groups, 
to other car automation technologies, and to those who 
prefer manual driving and ultimately to users of other 
types of digitized and connected products. 
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